ABSTRACT. In order to become aware of inconsistencies, one must first construe of the world in a way that reflects its consistencies. This paper begins with a tentative model for how a set of discrete memories transforms into an interconnected worldview, wherein relationships between memories are forged by way of abstractions. Inconsistencies prompt the invention of new abstractions. In regions of the conceptual network where inconsistencies abound, a cognitive analog of simulated annealing is in order; there is a willingness to question previous assumptions -to 'loosen' conceptual relationships -so as to let new concepts percolate through the worldview and exert the needed revolutionary effect. In so doing there is a risk of assimilating dangerous concepts. Repression arrests the process by which dangerous thoughts infiltrate the conceptual network, and deception blocks thoughts that have already been assimilated. These forms of self-initiated worldview inconsistency may evoke feelings of fragmentation at the level of the individual or the society.
INTRODUCTION
This volume addresses the question of how we detect and cope with worldview inconsistencies. The present paper will explore how inconsistencies promote abstractions that resolve them, and how abstractions percolate through the worldview and reconfigure it. But perhaps it is appropriate to begin by backing up to consider a more basic question: how is it that the human mind is aware of consistencies in its world? This is, in fact, no small feat. The primate mind, for example, is incapable of linking concepts together in a chain of associations and thereby determining the degree to which Foundations of Science 3: 395-428, 1999. they are consistent or inconsistent; it makes no attempt to stitch together strands of experience to create a coherent internal model of the fabric of reality. There is much evidence that this proclivity came into existence with the arrival of Homo erectus approximately 1.7 million years ago (Donald, 1991) . Section Two outlines a model of how this cognitive transition may have occurred. Since the model is presented in detail elsewhere (Gabora, 1999) it is explained here only insofar as is necessary to make sense of the material that follows.
Armed with an idea of how we forge and incrementally elaborate a more or less consistent internal model of the world, we are in a better position to understand what happens when inconsistencies are encountered. Section Three discusses how we 'patch holes' in our worldview by inventing abstractions, and how formidable inconsistencies prompt us to 'unravel and reweave', a process that can be modeled using a cognitive analog of simulated annealing.
Section Four deals with worldview inconsistencies that we introduce voluntarily (albeit often unconsciously) through censorship, repression, and deception. Censorship artificially curtails the process by which a new experience or idea gets woven into the individual's conceptual web. Deception perpetuates more deception, much as a fold tends to perpetuate itself along a length of fabric. These processes are less like to manifest as logical paradoxes than as generalized feelings of fragmentation.
Section Five takes a closer look at the 'worldview as tapestry' metaphor that has been developed in the previous sections, and attempts to tie the paper together, so to speak, by clarifying this metaphor.
The paper is speculative, heavier on theory than data (to say the least), so it won't be everyone's cup of tea. My goal in writing it was to express some provocative, interdisciplinary ideas that would round out this volume with a cognitive science perspective.
